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ELD-027        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4378 
___________ 
 
R. MICHAEL BEST; MARYLAND CLOSE CORP, (S Corp)  
(Director) of Ken & Jim CUC Inc. Wholly owned subsidiary  
of CUC of MD Inc.; DOCSON CONSULTING LLC, (SMLLC);  
KEITH DOUGHERTY, President/Secretary of CUC of MD Inc. 
 
v. 
 
US FOODS INC DELAWARE DIVISION; CLUCK U CORP;  
J. P. HADDAD; RICHARD DANIELS; CUMBERLAND  
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; CUMBERLAND  
COUNTY PROTHONOTARY; PRESIDENT JUDGE HESS,  
Cumberland County Common Pleas; JUDGE BRATTON, Dauphin County  
Common Pleas; ROBERT KODAK; CURTIS PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
 
       Keith Dougherty, 
 
          Appellant. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-14-cv-00922) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. Frederick Motz 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under  
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and for Possible Summary  
Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6  
April 30, 2015 
 
Before: RENDELL, SLOVITER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2015) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Keith Dougherty appeals from the order of the District Court denying 
reconsideration of its dismissal of his complaint.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 At issue here is another of Dougherty’s pro se complaints.  This time, Dougherty 
filed suit along with pro se plaintiff R. Michael Best and also purported to name as 
plaintiffs various entities which were not represented by counsel, including Dougherty’s 
company Docson Consulting LLC (“Docson”).  The complaint asserts purported federal 
claims against ten defendants, including parties with whom Dougherty has been involved 
in litigation in the past, their lawyers, and state-court judges who have presided over that 
litigation.  As with many of Dougherty’s filings, the complaint is largely unintelligible.  
All defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint on that ground and others, and the 
District Court dismissed it with prejudice.  The District Court later denied a series of 
plaintiffs’ post-judgment motions, including their motion for reconsideration and to 
disqualify the District Judge, and Dougherty alone appeals from those rulings.1 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Dougherty’s appeal from the order 
denying reconsideration brings up for review the underlying order dismissing the 
amended complaint.  See Long v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 436, 446 n.20 (3d Cir. 
2012).  We exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) 
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II. 
 The District Court did not identify Dougherty’s potential claims but, having done 
so ourselves, we agree that the complaint states no conceivably plausible claim as to 
Dougherty and are satisfied that amendment would be futile.  By way of further 
background, Cluck U Corporation (one of the defendants here) obtained a judgment 
against Dougherty’s company Docson in Maryland state court during a fast-food 
franchise dispute and transferred the judgment to Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, for 
execution.  Dougherty purported to remove the collection action to federal court pro se, 
but the District Court remanded it and we dismissed Dougherty’s appeal from that order 
for lack of jurisdiction.  (C.A. No. 11-3598, Dec. 14, 2011.)2 
 The complaint at issue here appears to allege that related defendants are  
seeking to collect a judgment against plaintiff Best arising from the same dispute.  The 
complaint alleges that certain defendants fraudulently obtained the judgment on the basis 
of a debt that Best does not owe because a deal for his purchase of a fast-food franchise 
fell through.  The complaint further alleges that two state-court judges have interfered  
                                                                                                                                                  
and ask whether it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 
(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted).  In doing so, we may review 
certain documents attached to the complaint.  See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 
(3d Cir. 2010).  We review the District Court’s denial of the disqualification motion for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 717 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014).   
 
2 Dougherty also has repeatedly attempted to litigate this underlying dispute in other 
federal courts.  See, e.g., Cluck-U, Corp. v. Dougherty ex rel. Docson Consulting LLC, 
538 F. App’x 312 (4th Cir. 2013); In re Dougherty, 408 F. App’x 692 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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with the right of one Larry Runk II (not a party here) to assign automobile insurance and  
legal and medical malpractice claims to Dougherty in apparently unrelated matters.  (The 
purported assignment of Runk’s insurance claim is at issue in the appeal at C.A. No. 15-
1271, which we are addressing in a separate opinion.) 
 On the basis of these allegations, the complaint asserts essentially three claims.  
First, the complaint asserts that all defendants have conspired to unlawfully seize 
personal property, and it seeks $300,000 in “proceeds” of the voided sale to plaintiff 
Best.  Second, the complaint alleges that all defendants have conspired to deny the 
alleged right of Dougherty’s entities and other individuals (apparently Best and Runk) to 
be represented by Dougherty pro se in state court.  Finally, the complaint seeks an 
injunction preventing state-court judges from “invalidating” Runk’s purportedly lawful 
assignment of his claims to Dougherty. 
 The complaint contains no factual allegations remotely suggesting that 
Dougherty’s claims may be plausible.  The first two claims appear to assert the interests 
only of plaintiff Best and other parties who have not appealed and contain nothing 
suggesting that Dougherty himself has an Article III stake in the outcome of Best’s 
apparent dispute.  Plaintiffs attached to the complaint an agreement between Dougherty 
and Best under which Dougherty appears to have purchased Best’s alleged claim and 
agreed to represent his interests.  (ECF No. 1-1 at 21-23.)  That agreement is substantially 
the same as the agreement between Dougherty and Runk that we address in C.A. Nos. 15-
1123 and 15-1271, and our observations in those appeals regarding champerty and 
Dougherty’s apparent unauthorized practice of law apply in this case as well.  The 
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complaint also appears to once again challenge execution proceedings against Docson 
and to assert Docson’s alleged right to Dougherty’s pro se representation in state court, 
but we need not address that issue because Docson has not appealed either.3   
 As for the third claim, and as the District Court noted, Dougherty’s demand for 
monetary damages against state-court judges and their staff is barred by judicial 
immunity.  See Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 250 (3d Cir. 2014); Capogrosso, 588 
F.3d at 184.  Dougherty’s express request for an injunction to overturn apparently 
unfavorable (but unspecified) state-court decisions that Dougherty alleges have injured 
him is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 
Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (applying Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923), and D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). 
 Finally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Judge’s denial of 
Dougherty’s motion for disqualification.  Dougherty relies on the District Court’s rulings 
against him and its repetition of our previous observation that he is a “vexatious litigant,” 
but those circumstances do not display actual or apparent partiality.  See, e.g., Knoll v. 
City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that references to a “silly 
case” and a “patently frivolous” motion were “patently insufficient to support a claim of 
bias”). 
                                              
3 We previously held that Dougherty is not permitted to represent Docson pro se in 
federal court.  See Dougherty v. Snyder, 469 F. App’x 71, 72-73 (3d Cir. 2012) (per 
curiam) (citing, inter alia, Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1993), 
and Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1966)).  Dougherty 
argues that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), has abrogated 
Rowland and Simbraw.  We need not and do not decide that issue because Docson has 
not appealed and Dougherty has not purported to appeal on its behalf pro se. 
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III.  
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Dougherty’s 
motion for reconsideration of the Clerk’s Order entered December 29, 2014, is granted 
only to the extent that we have reviewed and considered Dougherty’s state-court 
document titled “concise statement,” on which the Clerk properly advised Dougherty that 
no action would be taken.  Dougherty’s motions pending in this Court are otherwise 
denied. 
